OWL Claude
OWL / NETWORK LAB

DNS leak test

See which recursive resolvers actually answer your browser’s DNS queries.

Start test

Enter recursive egress IPs, separated by spaces or commas. A resolver’s public service address (such as 1.1.1.1) may differ from its egress addresses.

Starting connects to dnscheck.tools for authoritative DNS observations, addr.tools for IP/organization lookup, and OWL for the HTTP baseline. If OWL’s HTTP baseline is unavailable, addr.tools looks up the organization and approximate location of an independently measured public IP.

Ready when you are. External network probes begin only after you start.

Network reports stay in this tab unless you download them. OWL does not store candidate IPs, resolver IPs or SDP in its database. External services can observe your connection and apply their own policies.
HTTP / BASELINE

HTTP public addresses

Not observed

Comparison uses independently observed HTTP addresses. Missing IPv4/IPv6 baselines stay unverified.

Why can BrowserLeaks look different?

Both tests use 50 random names by default. BrowserLeaks uses its own DNS4/DNS6 endpoints; OWL uses dnscheck.tools with IPv4-only / IPv6-only authority zones. Provider networks, timing and lookup databases differ, so server counts and city names need not match.

This counts unique recursive egress IPs, not devices or queried names. One name may reach multiple resolver nodes, so 50 names can reveal more than 50 servers. A large count is not a leak by itself.

ISP and location describe the resolver, not your home. Google and Cloudflare can both appear because of Secure DNS, VPN settings or upstream forwarding. Metadata is approximate; unknown entries are not counted as an organization or location.

How to read the result

Each test generates unique hostnames, split across IPv4-only and IPv6-only authoritative DNS zones. Your browser resolves them; a WebSocket reports the resolvers actually seen by the authority. HTTP probe errors do not mean DNS failed. The query log distinguishes A, AAAA and HTTPS records.

Resolver count or a different country alone does not prove a leak. Compare with your VPN/DNS provider’s expected egress addresses. Only this browser’s sampled queries are covered; encrypted DNS to the resolver cannot be inferred from the resolver-to-authority transport.

Independent diagnostics by Owl. Results do not guarantee Claude access or account safety.

Source code & methodology ↗AGPL-3.0 ↗BrowserLeaks ↗DNS observation: dnscheck.tools ↗